



The phrase "War on Terror" has no discrete legal content. It was politically
inspired and used by the administration of George W. Bush to mobilize
American society, much like the "War on Drugs" or the "War on Poverty." Yet
the declaration of the "War on Terror" marks the beginning of a unique phase
in American law that began on September 11, 2001, and continues to this day.
Living through this period has made the lessons of Aharon Barak all the more
urgent.
Aharon Barak was born in Lithuania in 1936. He was one of the few who
miraculously survived the slaughter of Jews in that country during the Second
World War-together with his mother, he hid in the walls of a neighbor's
house. Barak moved to Israel after the war, became a professor of law at
Hebrew University in 1968, and later served as Dean of the Law Faculty. From
1975 to 1978 he was the Attorney General of Israel, and in that capacity helped
shape the Camp David peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Barak was
appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court in 1978, became the president of the
court in 1995, and retired from the court in September 2006. His rulings,
particularly those involving issues of national security, have been heralded
throughout the world and teach an important lesson -which we in the United
States have yet to learn-on how to be faithful to the rule of law in the face of a
terrorist threat.
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1.
Although the War on Terror is not itself a war, during the six years since it
began, the United States has launched three wars. One is in Iraq. Terrorism
was not the basis of our decision to invade, but if anything, terrorism has
become a consequence of the war and the occupation that inevitably followed.
When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, the administration had
no evidence that Saddam Hussein sponsored the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, nor has any been discovered since.
The second war-the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001-had a
direct and immediate connection to the events of September ii. The
administration determined that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks on
that day, and furthermore that the Taliban regime then in control of
Afghanistan had a special-indeed symbiotic- relationship with al Qaeda. Al
Qaeda had helped bring the regime to power, and in return the Taliban had
harbored and protected al Qaeda. When the Taliban refused to capture or turn
over al Qaeda's leaders, the United States invaded the country.
The third war -the war against al Qaeda itself- is the most difficult for
many of us to accept as a war, largely because al Qaeda is not a nation with
discrete geographic boundaries. It is an international organization that operates
in secret, but much like an enemy nation, has the declared aim of killing
Americans en masse, regardless of where they are found-Kenya, Tanzania,
New York, Washington, Kabul, or Baghdad. The purpose of these killings is
not clear-the stated justifications have ranged from the presence of U.S.
military bases in Saudi Arabia, to support for Israel, to the debased nature of
American civilization. But it was not necessary to identify a clear purpose
behind al Qaeda's actions or determine that it wishes to overthrow the
government in order to treat it as belligerent.
One week after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed a resolution
authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."' It was this resolution that
authorized the invasion of Afghanistan. That war has not eliminated the
determination or ability of al Qaeda to attack Americans, at home or abroad,
and as a result, the United States remains very much at war with al Oaeda.
Indeed, it is this war against al Qaeda, more than the invasion and occupation
of Iraq and the continuing American presence in Afghanistan, that gives
continuing vitality to the War on Terror. The administration has insisted that
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. S 1541 (Supp. 1 2001).
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the war against al Qaeda is a war that must be fought wherever al Qaeda might
be found, including the American homeland, and as a result the prosecution of
this war has posed the sharpest challenge to America's commitment to the rule
of law.
In speaking of the rule of law, I am referring to the law of the Constitution,
not the larger body of law that I call code. Code consists of the edicts, rules,
and regulations issued by government officials and agencies to serve the
purposes of the state. Sometimes these edicts instruct public officials on how to
discharge the duties of their offices. Elsewhere (for example, in the Internal
Revenue Code), these edicts are addressed to citizens in general. War often
requires adjustments in these codes or calls for the enactment of new codes that
help the state respond to the enemy.
In times of war, the threat is more to the Constitution than to code. As the
embodiment of the public morality of the nation, the Constitution is not
limited to the words appearing in the document written in 1787 or in the
twenty-seven amendments formally adopted over the last 220 years. It includes
principles, such as the separation of powers or the right to travel from state to
state, that are inferred from the overall structure of the Constitution. It also
extends to certain enactments of Congress that further expound the values
found in the text of the Framers. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, has
given the nation a fuller expression of "equal protection of the laws. '
Understood in this broader sense, the Constitution is laden with a special
normative value that derives from the role it plays in defining our national
identity-what it means to be American-and in articulating the governing
principles of our society.
War places great stress on society. It calls for major readjustments in
government and in ordinary life. Often people are called on to make enormous
sacrifices. In order to respond to these needs, code is often changed. The
executive promulgates new regulations, and Congress enacts statutes to meet
the exigencies of the war. The governing assumption of American society is
that these war measures will be undertaken within the terms of the
Constitution -that the allocation of powers among the branches set forth in
the Constitution will be respected and basic liberties will be honored. Ours is a
Constitution for times of war as well as times of peace.
The last six years have confounded this assumption and rendered the
example of Justice Barak especially compelling. He has honored the special
security needs of Israel while being adamant in protecting Israel's democratic
character. The contrast with the American experience is stark, even when a
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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principle as sacrosanct as the prohibition against torture is at stake. The war
against terrorism seems to have absolved the current administration from any
sense of limits.
Under a program called extraordinary rendition, persons suspected of
having al Qaeda ties have been abducted by American officials and then
transferred in secret to countries that routinely engage in torture as part of
their interrogation techniques. In delivering a person to a country where he
will likely be tortured, our government is as culpable as it would be had it
engaged in torture itself. Suits brought in the United States by some of these
victims were summarily dismissed by the lower federal courts. The judges
thought that any inquiry into the merits of the allegations would compromise
the President's direction of foreign affairs and military operations, and thus
would be inconsistent with the deference that is his due.
3
Internal memoranda of the administration, leaked after the disclosures of
the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib in Iraq, reveal a similar disregard for the
prohibition against torture. These memoranda narrow the definition of torture
in order to broaden the range of techniques that interrogators could use against
prisoners who might possess information about al QOeda. An August 2002
Department of Justice memorandum said that the infliction of physical pain
amounted to torture only when it was "equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death."' 4 A separate Department of Defense
memorandum, issued only months later, established guidelines for
interrogations at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. It suggested that two
practices until then universally understood as torture-the use of scenarios
designed to convince detainees that death is imminent, and use of a wet towel
and dripping water to induce fear of suffocation ("water-boarding")- though
forbidden "as a matter of policy ... at this time," nonetheless "may be legally
available."'
3. See E1-Masri v. United States, 479 F. 3d 296, 303-04, 313 (4 th Cir. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft,
414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281-83, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
4. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.coni/wp
-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo2002o8ol.pdf.
5. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., to the Sec'y of
Def. (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/o2.12.02.pdf.
A federal criminal statute implementing the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, see 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), specifically
provides that torture includes the mental anguish caused by the threat of imminent death.
See also Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007).
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These internal memoranda not only sought to lessen the force of the
prohibition against torture by broadening the range of permitted conduct, but
went further and implied that the prohibition did not apply whatsoever to the
President's pursuit of al Qaeda. The August 2002 Department of Justice
memorandum treated the prohibition against torture as nothing more than
code and therefore denied that it bound the President in his capacity as
Commander in Chief. Although in December 2004 the Department of Justice
publicly released a memorandum repudiating the strained definition of torture
announced in its 2002 memorandum, the 2004 memorandum did not disavow
the earlier assertion that the President had the power to authorize torture.
Rather, the memorandum said it was "unnecessary" to address the issue
because the President had -subsequent to the disclosures of Abu Ghraib and
the release of the earlier memorandum-issued a directive that U.S. personnel
not engage in torture.6
In the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress codified the constitutional
ban on torture. 7 The President fiercely resisted that measure, and although he
eventually signed the statute into law, he did so only with the declaration that
he intended to construe the law as consistent with his constitutional powers as
Commander in Chief and his duty to protect against future terrorist attacks. 8
This statement was widely understood to indicate that the President does not
believe himself bound by the terms of the Act. The President was entirely
correct that some statutes are mere code that cannot constitutionally interfere
with his powers as Commander in Chief, but the statutory ban on torture and
conduct falling within the broader category of cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment is different, because it codified an underlying constitutional
prohibition rooted in the Eighth Amendment that is superior to the President's
power to command the military.
Another constitutional principle that has been placed in jeopardy by the
United States' prosecution of the war against terrorism is the right of the
people to speak freely with one another without fear that the government is
eavesdropping on their conversations. This freedom is guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment but, in contrast to the rule against torture, is not
6. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy
Att'y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc234o234oa2.htm, superseding
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, supra note 4.
7. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003, 42 U.S.C.A. § 20oodd (West Supp. 2007).
8. President's Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2oos/12/2oo5123o-8.html.
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absolute-only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy are banned. Yet the
judiciary has historically protected the right of people to speak freely with one
another by requiring that the government, if at all possible, apply for a warrant
from a court before eavesdropping on private conversations.
The President was unprepared to abide by this rule in the pursuit of al
Qaeda. In 2005, news media revealed that soon after the September 11 attacks
the President authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept
communications between persons in the United States and persons abroad if
the NSA believed that one of the parties was linked to al Qaeda. These wiretaps
were conducted without warrants or any judicial oversight.
Out of deference to the President on issues of national security, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to bring wiretapping of the type in the NSA
program within the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In 1967,
the Court broke with precedent and held that wiretaps were a form of search
and thus fell within the terms of the Fourth Amendment and its warrant
requirement. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court was careful to distinguish
the case before it-the prosecution of an illegal gambling ring-from
surveillance for national security and declined to speak on the latter issue.'0 In
1972, as protests against the Vietnam War became more turbulent, the
Supreme Court extended the warrant requirement to what it termed "domestic
security cases"" -the particular case before the Court involved the prosecution
of a person suspected of having blown up a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The Court explicitly left unresolved whether warrants would be required for
surveillance against foreign powers and has not ruled on this issue to this day.
12
In 1978, Congress sought to fill this void by enacting the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).' 3 This statute prohibits governmental
surveillance of any communications involving a foreign power and a person
within the United States-even surveillance for national security purposes-
without authorization from a special court. The judges of this court are selected
by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; they meet in secret; the subject
of the tap receives no notice of the government's application; the court's
decision is rendered on the papers filed by the government; and the
government can prevail by showing only that the tap is likely to lead to foreign
intelligence that cannot reasonably be obtained through other methods.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Id. at 358 n.23.
ii. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
12. Id. at 3o8-o9.
13. 50 U.S.C. §§ 18oi-i8ii (2000).
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Since its enactment, FISA has been regarded as a comprehensive
framework for foreign intelligence surveillance of the type involved in the NSA
program. In his initial defense of that program, the Attorney General claimed,
rather unpersuasively, that the congressional resolution permitting the use of
force against terrorism had implicitly authorized the warrantless searches.14
This argument was overshadowed, however, by the Attorney General's bolder
claim that subjecting the President to the FISA requirements would
unconstitutionally impinge on his power to conduct war. The Attorney General
acknowledged that Congress has powers in the war domain -it can declare
war, make general regulations governing the armed forces, and appropriate the
funds for the military. Yet the Attorney General maintained that the NSA
wiretaps should be viewed much like any other strategic engagement with the
enemy, and, as such, within the President's powers as Commander in Chief.
Although this stance of the Attorney General raised significant questions
concerning the allocation of powers between Congress and the President, that
controversy now seems largely to have been overtaken by subsequent events. In
January 2007, after a federal court denied the government's motion to dismiss a
suit challenging the NSA program"5 and voters gave the Democrats control of
Congress, the Attorney General announced that the President would let the
authorization for this program lapse, although the Attorney General continued
to insist that the program was lawful. 16 In July 2007, the court of appeals
reversed the lower court's denial of the motion to dismiss the NSA lawsuit.' 7 It
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing. In August, Congress amended FISA to
authorize, for a period of up to one year, warrantless wiretapping similar to
that involved in the NSA program. 
8
The debates over the legality of the NSA wiretapping program should not
have focused on the conflict between the President and Congress and issues of
separation of powers, but rather on whether the program violated the Fourth
14. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to Senator William Frist (Jan. 19, 20o6), available
at http://news.findlaw.conVhdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsani9o6ltr.pdf; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (20o6), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaper
onnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
i5. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(mem.), vacated, 493 F. 3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
16. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter (Jan.
17, 2007), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/2oo6oll7gonzalesLetter
.pdf.
17. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
i8. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Star. 552 (2007) (to be codified in
scattered sections of So U.S.C.).
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Amendment, which is superior to any claims the President might have as
Commander in Chief and which is beyond the power of Congress to modify.
Although the Supreme Court has declined to speak to this issue, the reasons
that led the Court to impose the warrant requirement both in ordinary criminal
cases and in domestic security cases apply equally to wiretaps of the kind
involved in the NSA program. The warrant requirement does not prevent the
President from discovering criminal activity or from preventing acts of
terrorism, but requires only that he put his case to an independent magistrate,
as a way of minimizing abuses and avoiding the impairment of communicative
freedom that would occur if the public knew that the President could tap the
phones of anyone he claims is linked to al Qaeda.
While the debates over torture and warrantless surveillance have involved
disputes over the definition of terms and the applicability of various statutes,
the War on Terror's challenge to other constitutional principles has been more
overt and even more clearly illuminated by Barak's work. One striking example
involves what I call the principle of freedom.
In the United States, the principle of freedom is rooted in the
Constitution's Article I, Section 9 guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus -the
historic means of testing the legality of detention-and even more
fundamentally, in the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. The principle has given rise to
the long and noble American tradition against preventive detention, and denies
the government the power to incarcerate anyone without charging him with a
crime and swiftly bringing him to trial. The principle of freedom contains an
exception for the exigencies of war: as a matter of necessity, enemy combatants
can be seized on the battlefield and imprisoned for the duration of hostilities.1 9
In the midst of combat operations in Afghanistan, the President declared
that soldiers of the Taliban and al Qaeda taken into custody were not ordinary
prisoners of war but rather unlawful combatants or illegal enemy
combatants.20 According to the administration, this special designation
removes such detainees from the protection of the Third Geneva Convention
for prisoners of war and allows the military to interrogate them on a protracted
basis; to incarcerate them indefinitely, even beyond the duration of hostilities;
19. Ex Pane Qirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520
(2004).
2o. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001); see also Press
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/o2/2002O2o7-13.html; Memorandum from
the President to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf.
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and to try and to punish them for the simple act of fighting. Traditionally the
designation of unlawful combatant applied to individual spies, saboteurs, and
civilians who took up arms-never, as the President would have it, to entire
armies."
An initial test of the administration's detention policy came in the
prosecution of John Walker Lindh-the young American captured in
Afghanistan who admitted that he had taken up arms for the Taliban but
denied that he had any contacts whatsoever with al Qaeda. Citing the historic
rule that fighting is not a crime, Lindh filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
charging him with conspiracy to kill Americans. The district judge denied the
motion on the theory that Lindh was an illegal enemy combatant because he
had fought for the Taliban. Although the judge said that he was not blindly
deferring to the President's categorization, his opinion suggests otherwise. He
put the burden on Lindh to prove that he was not an unlawful combatant and
relied in part on inappropriate evidence-a book written before the war
indicating that the Taliban came to power by killing civilians -to conclude that
soldiers of the Taliban had been properly classified as unlawful combatants.22
The prisoners at Guantanamo - all foreign citizens - have also been treated
as illegal enemy combatants. A prison was set up at the Naval Station in
January 2002, and although al Qaeda suspects seized in a large number of
countries, including Bosnia, Thailand, and Zambia, have been incarcerated
there over the last five years, Guantanamo was first and foremost a prison for
persons captured in the war with Afghanistan. At one point it held as many as
8oo prisoners, and as of this writing more than 300 remain.
Some of these prisoners denied having taken up arms against the United
States or having links to al Qaeda or even the Taliban, insisting instead that
they were in Afghanistan or the border area for personal reasons or as aid
workers. These prisoners pressed their claim for freedom through writs of
habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed their
petitions on jurisdictional grounds, reasoning: "We cannot see why, or how,
the writ may be made available to aliens abroad when basic constitutional
protections are not."2 In its June 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme
Court set aside the judgment of the court of appeals, but did not address in any
direct and forthright way the lower court's underlying premise that aliens held
21. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-36.
2. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also Owen Fiss, In the
Shadow of War, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 467-68 (2003).
23. A] Odah v. United States, 321 F.3 d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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in Guantanamo have no constitutional rights.' The Supreme Court held
simply that the habeas statute gave the federal courts jurisdiction over such
petitions-and in so doing placed the right to freedom of the Guantanamo
prisoners at the mercy of the legislature. In December 2005, as part of the
Detainee Treatment Act, Congress amended the habeas statute to bar petitions
by the Guantanamo prisoners."
The administration has not been content to confine the illegal enemy
combatant designation to those seized in Afghanistan or other theaters of
armed conflict. The war against al Qaeda knows no bounds, and the members
of al Qaeda can be seized and held as unlawful combatants, the administration
has insisted, wherever they may be found, including the United States. Under
this policy, the government arrested a citizen of Qatar (Ali Saleh Kahlah al-
Marri), who was studying at Bradley University in Illinois but who the
administration believed was an operative of al Qaeda-a so-called sleeper
agent. He is now being held as an illegal enemy combatant at a naval brig in
South Carolina. Similarly, an American citizen (Jose Padilla) was arrested at
O'Hare International Airport in Chicago and held in the same brig for more
than three years before being charged with a crime in federal court.
Although al-Marri recently won an important victory in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit-a panel of the court held that it had
jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition and that there was no basis to hold
him as an enemy combatant-that decision is now being reviewed by the
Fourth Circuit sitting en banc.26 In the case of Padilla, the Supreme Court had
two opportunities to address his claim of freedom, and in each instance, failed
to do so. On the first occasion, the Court said merely that Padilla should have
filed his habeas petition in South Carolina rather than in New York, even
though that alleged error had no bearing on the power of the Supreme Court
to address his claim to freedom. 7 On the second occasion, the Supreme Court
denied Padilla's certiorari petition. 8 Presumably, the Court thought that the
petition was moot since days before the response to Padilla's petition for a writ
of certiorari was due, the administration changed its strategy and charged him
24. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
25. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § oo5(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
26. A1-Marri v. Wright, 487 F. 3 d 16o (4 th Cir. 2007), reh'ggranted, No. 06-7427 (4 th Cir. Aug.
22, 2007).
27. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
28. Padila v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1O62 (2006).
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with a crime in federal court in Florida, though carefully reserving the power to
treat him as an illegal enemy combatant in the future. 9
The sweep of the administration's detention policies poses a grave threat to
American society. The issue is not whether the fight against al Qaeda is a
"war," but whether the United States is a "battleground" similar to
Afghanistan. To treat it as such would threaten the fabric of ordinary life and
put the enemy combatant exception to the principle of freedom in the position
of undermining the principle itself. The executive would be able to imprison
anyone living within our midst-citizen and noncitizen alike-without ever
charging him with a crime and putting him on trial.
The administration's policies in its fight against terrorism have also called
into question yet another constitutional principle rooted in the Due Process
Clause-the principle of fair procedure. In July 2004, the administration
established at Guantanamo a system of tribunals, denominated Combatant
Status Review Tribunals, to resolve the claims of prisoners held there who
maintained that their detention was improper because they had neither fought
for nor lent material aid to the Taliban or al Qaeda.3° Even though about forty
prisoners have been released by these tribunals over the last three years, the
procedures used by these tribunals are an affront to elementary notions of
fairness. They are staffed by the military and freed of the ordinary rules of
evidence. The prisoners are provided with "personal representatives," but these
representatives are not lawyers -only military officers with security clearance.
In the December 2005 statute denying the Guantanamo prisoners the right to
secure their freedom through a writ of habeas corpus, Congress gave the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, but limited the scope of
review. The court of appeals could not set aside a decision even if the court
believed that the decision was clearly erroneous. It could do no more than
ascertain whether the tribunals' decisions complied with the standards and
procedures established by the Secretary of Defense and whether those
standards and procedures are constitutional "to the extent that the
Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable."'"
29. In August 2007, Padilla was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and of conspiracy to
provide material support to terrorists. See Peter Whoriskey, Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of
Terror Charges, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2007, at Ai.
30. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy (July 7,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2oo4/d2oo4o7o7review.pdf.
31. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(3), 1O U.S.C.A. § 8oi note (West Supp. 2007).
The adequacy of the procedures of these status review tribunals is now under review by the
Court of Appeals. See Bismullah v. Gates, Nos. o6-1197, o6-1397, 2007 WL 2067938 (D.C.
Cir. July 20, 2007).
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Although all of the Guantanamo prisoners are being held indefinitely and
have been subject to relentless and aggressive questioning, some have the
additional burden of being charged with war crimes and being placed on trial
before military commissions. These commissions are to be distinguished from
courts-martial or federal courts, inasmuch as they were convened for limited
purposes-to try some of the Guantanamo prisoners-and follow procedures
specially designed, as one might expect of code, to accommodate the perceived
necessities of the war against al Qaeda.
In its June 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held
the use of these commissions unlawful.32 Speaking generally, the Court
described military commissions as tribunals of exigency and emphasized that
they had historically been used to try persons "caught redhanded in a theater of
war."33 The Court put to one side the use of military commissions in a
battlefield, and warned against transforming military commissions "from a
tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient adjudicatory tool."34 Yet,
avoiding any due process ruling, the Court held only that the Guantanamo
military commissions violated a provision of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice requiring that all the rules and regulations for courts-martial and
military commissions be "uniform insofar as practical."'35
By way of example, the Court noted that, in contrast to procedures for
courts-martial, the regulations governing the Guantanamo commissions
allowed the accused to be excluded from proceedings or denied access to the
evidence used against him under a broad range of circumstances. The Court
further noted that the commissions operated under an evidentiary standard
more permissive than that governing courts-martial, one that seemed to permit
evidence obtained from coercion. 6 The Court was also concerned that the
accused had no right to appeal his conviction to a civilian court unless the
penalty imposed was death or imprisonment for more than ten years. For lesser
penalties, appeals were at the discretion of the reviewing court.
The Court's narrow statutory response to what was fundamentally a
constitutional question -a minimalist approach of the kind Justice Barak has
often warned against-had the perverse effect of further imperiling
fundamental values. In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which affirmed the ban on habeas petitions by the
32. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
33. Id. at 2785.
34. Id. at 2792-93.
35. Id. at 2756 (quoting io U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)).
36. Id. at 2786.
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Guantanamo prisoners, clearly making it applicable to all pending cases, and
explicitly granted the administration authority to use military commissions to
try those prisoners.37 Only in a few respects were the procedural protections of
the accused enlarged. In February 2007 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit upheld this statute against a constitutional challenge. The court
reaffirmed its view that the Guantanamo prisoners have no constitutional
rights and thus are not protected by the rules limiting congressional power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 8 In June 2007, the Supreme Court agreed
to review this judgment, providing itself another opportunity to address the
issue that previously it steadfastly had declined to examine.
At issue in Hamdan were the rights of foreign citizens held not in the
United States but in Guantanamo. Even when the liberties of American citizens
are at issue, however, the Court has been willing to accommodate the demands
of the executive by compromising due process values. This occurred in the
2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving an American citizen who had
been taken into custody in Afghanistan and imprisoned in a naval brig in
Norfolk, Virginia. 9 The government claimed that the prisoner had fought for
the Taliban and therefore was an illegal enemy combatant. His father (who had
brought the suit) denied that allegation and insisted his son went to
Afghanistan in August 2001 to do relief work.
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor tried to strike a balance
between conflicting considerations, as Justice Barak often did. Much in his
model, she declared that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. ''40 She held that the
prisoner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the government's
allegations. She based this ruling on the Fifth Amendment right to due
process-a consideration noticeably lacking in Hamdan. She also indicated-
without any elaboration- that Hamdi had a right to counsel in these
proceedings.
However, the balance O'Connor struck was far more compromising of
fundamental principles than Barak would have allowed. As she put it, the
prisoners' procedural rights had to be carefully "tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military
37- Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 26oo (2006) (to be
codified in scattered sections of io, 18, 28, and 42 U.S. C.).
38. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 27 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
40. Id. at 536 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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conflict."4' Accordingly, Justice O'Connor allowed the government to support
its charge that a prisoner is an enemy combatant by submitting an affidavit
based on records, maintained by the military, of battlefield detainees. Such an
affidavit would create a presumption, she said, that the prisoner is an enemy
combatant. The prisoner would then bear the burden of presenting evidence to
rebut the presumption and to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. In this
way, O'Connor nominally denied the administration its "blank check" while
nonetheless acceding to its demands for deference in matters of national
security.4 2
Justice O'Connor also expressed the view-in this instance not supported
by a majority-that a military tribunal could provide the evidentiary hearing
that she required. Such a concession does a disservice to due process, which has
long been held to require an impartial or neutral decision maker when only
property rights are threatened by the government. It also ignores the
constitutional basis of the prisoners' claim of freedom and the need to hold the
evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas court, not simply because such a court
can achieve a measure of impartiality unavailable to a military tribunal judging
the action of the military, but also and more fundamentally, because in the
American constitutional scheme, it is the federal judiciary that is responsible
for determining whether an individual has been deprived of a constitutionally
guaranteed right, like the right to freedom. 43
1l.
In all these ways the administration's prosecution of the war against
terrorism has endangered the Constitution. Since September 11, we have
witnessed an assault on a number of constitutional principles -the prohibition
against torture, the requirement of judicial warrants for wiretapping, the
principle of personal freedom, and the insistence upon fair procedures to test
government-imposed deprivations of liberty. These transgressions -and more
may later come to light- have done great violence to the rule of law and have
made the achievements of Aharon Barak appear all the more remarkable. What
once was an attitude of admiration, only six years into America's War on
Terror, has now become one of marvel. He safeguarded basic liberties in a
41. Id. at 533.
42. Id. at 533-34.
43. See Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 243-44 (2006).
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context in which the threat to national security was as great as, if not greater
than, the threat facing the United States.
We in the United States have the benefit of geographic distance. Iraq and
Afghanistan are geographically remote. Al Qaeda might have agents within the
United States, but its nerve center is located half a world away- somewhere in
the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Israel's enemies, like Syria
and Iran, are its neighbors, and terrorist organizations have their centers on
Israel's borders: Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.
The suicide bombings in Israel and the rockets of Hezbollah and Hamas
may not have the same quality of spectacle as the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the United States, but they have been more pervasive and have wrought
death and destruction on an enormous scale, especially given the small size of
the country. The threat of terrorism is part of the fabric of everyday life in
Israel.
Some of the acts of terrorism Israel has encountered are fueled by the same
kind of inchoate hatred that impels al Qaeda. Others have a discrete strategic
objective: to bring an end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and
thus to create a Palestinian state in those territories. Still others, for example
the terrorist attacks associated with Hezbollah and Hamas, seek to eradicate
Israel as a nation and establish a Palestinian state stretching from Jordan to the
sea. The attacks that al Qaeda has aimed at the United States cannot plausibly
be regarded as having such grandiose ambitions.
Not only were the pleas of military necessity confronting Barak more
pressing than those faced by American courts in recent years, but the sources
upon which claims of rights rested were more elusive. As he acknowledged, he
had to develop "constitutional law without a constitution."44 Israel has no
written constitution. At the time of its founding, plans were made for the
formulation and adoption of a constitution. Indeed, its Declaration of
Independence promised that a constitution would be adopted no later than
October 1, 1948. But those plans never came to fruition. So Barak, following in
the tradition of his predecessors, constructed the governing principles of
Israel-its body of constitutional law-as an elaboration of Israel's
foundational aspiration, set forth in the Declaration of Independence, to be a
free and democratic society. In his terrorism cases, Justice Barak drew on a
variety of sources, including customary international law and various statutes,
but in the end, constructed what he described as Israel's "constitutional law"
on the basis of theoretical reflections on the requirements of democracy. Such a
rationalistic endeavor is also the core of the process that has given content and
44. Aharon Barak, Consitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary, in THE
ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCITY 448 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988).
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life to the American constitutional tradition, but the American court has
enjoyed the comfort of a material anchor -the written Constitution of 1787 and
all its amendments.
Israel is governed through a parliamentary system, which among other
things means that it is committed to the principle of legislative supremacy.
Once the plan to adopt a written constitution failed, the Israeli Parliament (the
Knesset) began enacting a series of statutes known as the Basic Laws which
purported to set forth the governing principles of Israeli society. For Israel's
first forty years, the Basic Laws primarily addressed the structure and
organization of government powers. In 1992, however, the Knesset took a new
turn and adopted a Basic Law guaranteeing human dignity and freedom, a law
that resembles the American Bill of Rights in both the generosity of its spirit
and the generality of its language. This Basic Law has functioned for Justice
Barak much like a written constitution with one important exception: the
supremacy of the legislature is preserved.
In a well-known 1995 decision, Justice Barak held that because the Basic
Laws were passed by the Knesset sitting as a constitutional assembly, they took
precedence over ordinary legislation (even if adopted after the enactment of the
Basic Law) .41 Yet the legislature remains supreme. The Knesset possesses the
power to amend any Basic Law in order to allow a statute that would otherwise
be invalid because of a conflict with it. Generally, a Basic Law can be amended
by a simple majority of the members of the Parliament present, although
certain provisions of some of the Basic Laws-not the one on human dignity-
stipulate that an amendment requires an absolute majority of all members of
Parliament or a supermajority.
Israel is a small country of around seven million people, covering a compact
geographic area roughly the size of New Jersey. Its political culture is
characterized by vibrant public discussion (to understate the matter). Barak's
decisions are widely known throughout the nation and remain a subject of
great controversy. They have even provoked attempts to overturn his decisions
by legislative means. Most recently, the Minister of Justice proposed amending
the Basic Law on human dignity in order to overturn a decision-one of
Barak's last-that invalidated a statute that had exempted the state from
compensating Palestinians in designated zones in the Occupied Territories for
injuries caused by Israeli security forces, even if the injuries did not relate to
military operations or the war against terrorism. 6 Yet, as of this writing, none
45. CA 6821/93, 1908/94, 3363/94 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC
49(4) 221, translated in 31 IsR. L. REv. 764, 777-94 (1997).
46. See Yuval Yoaz, Friedmann Seeks New Version of "Intifada Law," Bypassing Court, HAARETz
(Tel Aviv), June 5, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/haserVspages/867274.html.
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of these efforts has succeeded. It is a testament both to Justice Barak and to the
strength of the country's foundational commitments that no Basic Law has
been amended to overturn a Supreme Court decision relating to terrorism or
issues of national security more broadly.
Barak's constitution is a constitution without borders. It binds Israeli
officials wherever they may be and protects citizens and noncitizens alike.
There are no black holes such as Guantanamo. Its overarching aim is to protect
human dignity. Barak sees human dignity as lying at the foundation of
democracy, and treats it as the source of rights people are owed simply by
virtue of their humanity. The depth of his commitment to human dignity is
most clearly revealed in his decision denying the military the authority to
subject anyone, including Palestinians or even suspected members of Hamas or
Hezbollah, to harsh and aggressive interrogation techniques that he regarded
as torture.47 Impelled by respect for the dignity of all persons, he fashioned a
prohibition against torture that is as absolute as the one found, at least before
September ii, in the U.S. Constitution.
Some commentators have called into question the absolute nature of this
prohibition by imagining a scenario in which the only way to avoid a great loss
of human life and other disastrous consequences is through torturing a
prisoner. In this scenario, a bomb of enormous power is ticking away in a city
and only the prisoner knows where it is located. In his ruling banning
especially aggressive interrogation techniques, Justice Barak confronted this
dilemma, even though the facts before him did not require him to do so, and
he held that even in such a dire context a prior authorization of torture would
be unconstitutional. The offense to human dignity would be too gross.
Barak acknowledged that, at a criminal trial after the fact, the guard who
tortured the prisoner in this imagined scenario might - only might - be able to
assert the defense of necessity and on that ground be exonerated. Some have
criticized him for this concession. They fail, however, to account for the fact
that even the most absolute of rules are often tempered in administration. In
the United States, for example, someone who tortured a prisoner to save
innocent lives or the destruction of a city could assert a necessity defense or,
more likely, trust a sympathetic jury to nullify the law through a general verdict
of "not guilty."
For the most part, Justice Barak's principles are not absolutes like the
prohibition against torture, but rather seek an accommodation of conflicting
47. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [Sept. 6, 1999] slip op., available
at http://elyoni.court.gov.il/files-eng/94/ooo/05i/ao9/94OSlOoo.ao9.pdf.
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values, or as he has put it, "clashing considerations." 48 In that sense, they are
like the Fifth Amendment's requirement of due process or the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches. The terms "due" and
"unreasonable" necessarily entail a consideration of conflicting values, and as a
result the liberties that these amendments promise are especially vulnerable in
times of stress. Military necessity is often invoked in such circumstances to
justify a sacrifice of individual freedom. For that reason, Barak's work is
especially instructive because he has sought to create a distinctive judicial
method - call it a jurisprudence - that acknowledges military necessity without
permitting it to overwhelm fundamental freedoms.
This method accounts for two of his most important rulings on terrorism.
One required the Israeli military to reroute the security fence that it was
building between itself and the Occupied Territories to prevent the infiltration
of suicide bombers and other terrorists.49 The other -the so-called targeted
killing case -limited the power of the military to kill persons who are civilians
but who are suspected by the military of engaging in terrorist activities in
Israel. s°
Like any good judge, Barak began his analysis in these cases with an
acknowledgment of the values - all the values - at stake in the controversy. He
recognized the interest served by the government's action as well as the harms
that would likely be inflicted by the proposed action. He accepted that national
security-the survival of the nation and the protection of the lives of Israeli
citizens-was a compelling justification for government action. But he also
maintained that respect for human rights and human dignity were pillars of
democracy and could not be casually brushed aside.
Although many jurists have faced similar dilemmas, Barak's distinctive
contribution has been to place limits on the deference due to the military. In
his opinions, he drew a vital distinction between the assessment of military
needs and the question of whether the military action is normatively justified,
given its impact on fundamental values. He was prepared to defer to the
government in its assessment of military needs, but saw it as the essence of his
job to determine whether the pursuit of those needs unjustifiably interfered
with the exercise of a protected liberty or a fundamental value.
48. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [Dec. 11, 2006] slip op.
para. 22 (quoting HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister [2005] para. 29), available at
http://elyoni.court.gov.iVfiles-eng/o2/69o/oo7/a34/o2oo769o.a34.pdf.
49. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel (June 30, 2004] slip op., available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.iVfiles-eng/o4/56o/o2o/a28/o4oo56o.a28.pdf.
so. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [Dec. 11, 20o6] slip op.,
available at http://elyoni.court.gov.i/files-eng/o2/69o/oo7/a34/o2oo769o.a34.pdf.
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In the case regarding the construction of a security fence, for example,
those contesting the route of the fence offered evidence -experts with
considerable military experience-to demonstrate how the military's needs
could be satisfied by building the fence along a line other than the one
proposed. Yet Justice Barak was unprepared to second-guess the military on
that score, and regarded the military's judgment on how to satisfy its needs as
determinative. He took this view not simply because of the military's expertise
on issues of national security, but rather, and perhaps more fundamentally,
because the military alone is responsible for the technical quality of its actions.
By contrast, Barak reserved for the court the function of determining whether
the infringement of basic rights would be so great as to bar the military from
acting as it wished. There was to be no deference in the realm of values. That
judgment, in his view, belonged to the judiciary.
We in the United States have a strong tradition of judicial deference to
military authorities, but fail to make Barak's distinction. Our deference goes
not just to the military's technical assessment of the needs of national security,
but also to the question of whether, given the harm to fundamental values, its
proposed actions are justified. By granting the executive wide latitude both in
its pursuit of its objectives and in its determination that those objectives merit
sacrificing basic freedoms, the American judiciary allows the executive to strike
the balance between military necessity and fundamental values. Such blanket
deference overlooks the genuine danger to fundamental values posed by a
political agency's response to perceived military needs or external dangers. It is
true that in a presidential system, such as that of the United States, the
executive and the legislature have independent sources of legitimacy, and thus
the legislature can act as a check on the executive. Yet, as the enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commission Act of 20o6, and the
recent amendment of FISA illustrate, the legislature can also be complicit in the
transgression of basic liberties in its response to the call to war. In this respect,
judicial deference to the executive of the type Barak opposed is no more
justified in a presidential system than in the Israeli parliamentary system.
Justice O'Connor was explicit in Hamdi about the need for deference to the
executive in fashioning procedural rules for adjudicating a claim to freedom by
any individual - even a citizen - accused of being an enemy combatant. Not
only was she willing to place on the prisoner the burden of proving that the
military's field records were mistaken, but she also would have allowed
military tribunals to decide the merits of that claim. A similar deference was
manifest in the Supreme Court's refusal to force the government either to
charge Jose Padilla with a crime or set him free, as well as in lower courts'
decisions not to give redress to victims of extraordinary rendition or even to
inquire into the merits of their allegations. I suspect that fear of interfering
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with the executive's capacity to conduct foreign affairs also explains why in
1972 the Supreme Court, in the case involving the bombing of a CIA building
in Ann Arbor, created an artificial distinction between "domestic security cases"
and "foreign intelligence surveillance," and declined to create a warrant
requirement for the latter.'
Not only has Barak rejected this kind of blanket deference as a dereliction
of what he understands to be the duty of a judge, but he has also identified
with greater clarity than any American jurist the appropriate inquiries for
determining when a government action that affects fundamental values is
justified. These inquiries, which he generally refers to as the "proportionality
test," examine both the instrumental and the substantive rationality of the
government's action. Justice Barak pursued these inquiries in all manner of
cases, especially in recent years, but they had their greatest force in his rulings
on national security. For that reason, they are especially illuminating in
gauging the American response to terrorism.
The instrumental inquiry concerns the relation between means and ends. It
asks whether the means chosen by the government are rationally related to the
end, and more importantly, whether the chosen means are the least restrictive
alternative. Barak requires that the means be narrowly tailored to achieve their
purpose, fitting, to use his metaphor, as closely as a suit might fit a body."2 The
sacrifice of fundamental values must be kept to an absolute minimum. He
expects that if the government has an alternative way of meeting its needs that
entails less of a sacrifice in fundamental values, the original, more burdensome
actions cannot be justified.
In the targeted killings case, for example, Barak fully appreciated the
danger of terrorist attacks, but sought to carefully cabin the power of the
military to kill suspected terrorists. He drew a sharp line between enemy
combatants and civilians, and was wary of placing civilians who were suspected
of terrorism in yet a third category - unlawful combatants - that would afford
neither the protections given to combatants nor those given to civilians.
Although the laws of war allow the military to kill combatants in the course of
armed conflict, civilians are fully protected. Civilians forfeit this protection
when they participate in hostilities, such as terrorist attacks, but Justice Barak
stringently defined the conditions for such forfeiture. Links to or membership
in a terrorist organization were not sufficient. The person targeted, according
to Barak, had to take a direct part in hostilities and was vulnerable to attack
only while engaged in such hostilities. Even then, the military had the
51. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308-09 (1972).
52. See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 256-57 (20o6).
117:256 2007
HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 276 2007-2008
LAW IS EVERYWHERE
obligation to pursue only the least harmful means and could not kill the
suspected terrorist if arrest and trial were feasible. As Barak reasoned, "among
the military means, one must choose the means whose harm to the human
rights of the harmed person is smallest." 3
The American Supreme Court, under the rubric of strict scrutiny, has
required that when a fundamental value such as free speech or racial equality is
threatened, the government must use the least restrictive means available to
pursue its end -or to use another formulation, governmental interference with
a privileged value must be no greater than necessary. Unfortunately, however,
the Court applies strict scrutiny only intermittently, and hardly ever in the
context of war. Perhaps most famously, the Supreme Court did not insist upon
the least restrictive means or least harmful alternative in the Korematsu case,
even though in that decision the Court announced-for the very first time-
that racial classifications should be strictly scrutinized.-4 Korematsu gave
constitutional legitimacy to the mass relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry
in the western states during the Second World War. Although the Court said
that it was applying strict scrutiny to the relocation program, it nevertheless
deferred to the government's assessment of the need for such a policy and,
furthermore, never considered whether less harmful alternatives were available.
The second type of inquiry in Barak's decisions - an inquiry which could be
characterized as an investigation into substantive rationality -asks whether the
harm of the government action is disproportionate to the benefit that might be
achieved from it. In other words, even if the government's action serves
compelling interests and its means are rationally connected to the pursuit of
those interests, and in fact represents the least restrictive alternative, that action
will nevertheless be unjustified and thus unlawful if the harm it inflicts is
disproportionately greater than the gains it achieves. Aside from some
concurring and dissenting opinions by Justice Breyer,"5 there is no trace of this
proportionality requirement in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
certainly not in the context of war, and yet Justice Barak routinely and
successfully applied it in a wide range of cases in which fundamental values
were at stake.
In fact, proportionality was the linchpin of Barak's opinion in the security
fence case. Although he accepted the military's claim that its proposed lines for
53. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [Dec. 11, 2006] slip op.
para. 40, available at http://elyoni.court.gov.iVfies-eng/o2/69o/oo7/a34/o2oo769o.a34.pdf.
54. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
55. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2819
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401-02
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the security fence would be the most effective in saving the lives of Israeli
citizens and that any redrawing of the lines would result in increased loss of life
from terrorist attacks, he nonetheless ordered sections of the fence built along a
different line in order to reduce the harm to Palestinians that would result from
division of their communities and separation from their fields and places of
work. The harm of the lines proposed by the military was deemed
disproportionate to any advantages in the realm of security. Put another way,
Barak was prepared to impair the achievement of military ends- to risk Israeli
lives -in order to avoid the greater harm to the Palestinian communities that
would have resulted from the erection of the security barrier as originally
planned. His intention was not to demean the importance of the military
objective, but rather to find a way to accommodate two compelling, but
conflicting, values.
In all this -his refusal to defer to the military in the tradeoff of values, his
insistence upon the least restrictive alternative, and finally his application of the
requirement that the harm to fundamental values not be disproportionate to
the security gains -Justice Barak held firm in his attachment to law and the
belief that law is the embodiment of reason in the service of humanity. His
method was to demand, systematically and relentlessly, that any sacrifices of
rights required by a proper regard for human dignity be fully and rationally
justified. In so doing, Barak revealed a deep and profound commitment to
reason- the common element that unites his life as a professor and as a judge
and that defines his unique place in Israeli society and the world legal
community. For him to declare, as he has done on many occasions, that "law is
everywhere" 6 is to invite us to imagine that every aspect of our public life, even
war, should be governed by reason and reason alone.
Aharon Barak and I are the closest of friends, but I have often wondered in
private: Isn't it remarkable that in such a small corner of the world, so often
racked by violence and religious passions, a modern day apostle of the
Enlightenment has risen and taken a place not just in the history of Israel, but
of all mankind?
56. See, e.g., BARAK, supra note 52, at 309.
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